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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RON DOUGHERTY and JUDITH A.
DOUGHERTY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 13854

CALIFORNIA-PACIFIC UTILITIES
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The plaintiffs and respondents agree substantially
with the statement of the kind of case made by the defendant
and the appellant to the effect that the plaintiffs desire
the enforcement of the money judgment against the defendant
California-Pacific Utilities Company for damages to plaintiffs1
culinary well and to the basement of their home and for the
cost of hauling culinary water to their home resulting from
the defendant's negligence allowing water to overflow the
banks of its canal during and following a severe rain and
hailstorm.

The only argument pertaining to this statement

of the kind of case would apply to the term the severe rain
and hailstorm, and this probably is a question of fact rather
than the statement of the kind of case.
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DISPOSITION

IN TIIK LOWER

COURT

The trial court, FiiLing w i t h o u t a jury, h e a r d

the

case on t.lu- 2^th d a y of M a y , l l) 7-, and g r a n t e d a m e m o r a n d u m
deci ••-; • ii-.
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^nae i :K U)iirt w a s n u t uitlrely h a p p y

the items as submit ten by c o u n s e l , and
a c t u a l Judgmere
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ni- urucii v ns

of 1 n v and p r o p o s e d J u d g m e n t and s u b m i , j ' d
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In i h«- --nm . ,r $896.1}"' -md costs ui cut. *

a g a i n s t the d e f e n d a n t
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originals

being

Lhn Coin l Ln I lie Clerk: ai id liied ' v the

C l e r k on 11 S e p t e m b e r ,

1974.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON

APPEAL

T h e p l a i n t i f f s and r e s p o n d e n t s seeks to nave

the

t r i a l C o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t a f f i r m e d and t oJ .1 c e Led.

S T A T E M E N T OF FA CITS

facts.

R e s p o n d e n t s b e l i e v e that the f a c t s a r e as f o l l o w s :

T h a t the d e f e n d a n t owned a p o w e r p l a n t located in the close
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-3proximity to the Santa Clara River near Veyo, Washington
County, Utah,

That the said power plant was a hydro electric

plant run by water conveyed to the power plant from a point
upstream on the Santa Clara River near the Baker Reservoir
and conveyed by virtue of a canal known as hydro canal No. 2.
After said water runs through the generating plant and other
plants, it eventually gets back into the Santa Clara River.
This canal was owned,operated and maintained by the defendant.
Said canal was built substantially before the action
and had been operated for many years. While it had been constructed to accomodate 16 cubic feet per second of water, it
had been allowed to fill up and would not actually carry this
water.

At the same time, it is admitted that the diversion

works located at the head of the canal on the Santa Clara
River would take the water out of the river up to 16 cubic
feet.

This can be found in the testimony of Wallace K. Smith

in the transcript commencing on page 91 and running through
page 96 of said transcript.

While 30 cubic feet of water

were appropriated by the defendant on a non-consumptive use,
the diversion of 16 cubic feet is claimed to be maximum by
the defendant.

The use of said water was such that in the

area known as the forebay immediately above the power, plant
it was held at a level just below the bank, and in the event
of a decrease in the amount of water running in the canal,
the nozzle was also decreased in size to assure pressure on
the head and on the nozzle.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-4Defendant contends that there were at least four
control devices for achieving the proper pressure and water
volume, and these are primarily shown in the map offered by
defendant as defendant's exhibit 3.

According to this map

and the testimony from the engineer of the power company,
to-wit, Wallace K. Smith, there was a device at the point
of diversion that automatically allowed a maximum 16 cubic
feet of water into the canal and no more; an overflow device
above the plaintiffs1 property to avoid ice jam; a third
device just downstream from plaintiffs1 property just above
the forebay which consisted of an area that all water could
be let out simply by removing boards; and the fourth device,
which was a nozzle, at the end of the penstock by which the
pressure of the water onto the water wheel was controlled
which could be shut off completely or could be opened to ten
inches.
Prior to the occasion,the plaintiffs had purchased
land immediately east of the canal and about 2,000 feet upstream from said forebay and power plant and built a home
thereon.

For culinary water they had a well, which was in

the process of being completed on the 8th of August, 1971,
the date on which the damage occurred.
On August 8, 1971, a rainstorm occurred, and although two agents of the defendant were on the ground and
saw the flooding and saw the damage, they did nothing to
alleviate same.

Although these were experienced men and
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-oexperienced w o r k m e n and employees of the defenda nt aiic 1 knew
that, l.he actual damage' was occurring and knew that at least
two of the safety measures, to-wi'. , opening the nozzle and
opening the boar^'^ c )i i i ;he foreba} •

:

imed iafoJL alleviate

the damage and a rove up and down i.he bank after seeing same.
Also, this type of flooding was common :i n the area and was
(A el ] -"I ::i 10 \ i i 1 to the d e f e n d a n t , bi it i lot to the pla:i n t i f f s »

When

D o u g h e r t y , ont. of tht p l a i n t i f f s , m a d e a demand for
m o n e t a r y reimbursement on 7 September, 197 , •: va. answered
• -.:•

~. •'. sjaunt and ... \:,J^W

M a n a g e r of the

d e f e n d a n t on 2~> September, l u 7 i t *•• t hi effect uha f siK.h
' •tl i

f l o o d i n , I:. - a. r,r-r.-.i
h e a v y rainfall*

\v \ M a

i

>• • >- - a i -*

.; ei:

L uouid be expected that areas

in # h*' pa-i vi ! 1 have flooding after

w h i c h h a v e b e e n flooded

\ - submitted that Ivan H u n t , foreman oi : he h y d r o
plant . m d the g e n t l e m e n r e s p o n s i b l e for *:h>- acta on;aeit'ii'j.!/1.

*<->

*'•- immediate a r e a had actual knowledge * . the

c o n d i t i o n ;u the rain and si orn: a n d w a s immediately u p o n t h e
area

a n d noticed over*

n.t same is true ^i

j

;« \

-.»n> places and d:I d i iotl i ing.

K, i Hadley, another employee of the

defendant.
• .:;;

;•

.

,

.-M: t \

h.<

*.

n

an area knouu a - .< ( loudburst are^i and extremely heav) Local
storms could happen at anytime.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IN ANYWAY COMMIT ERROR
IN FINDING THAT THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF RESULTED FROM THE
DEFENDANT'S NEfiTTrtF-NC-F.
; ;

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT THE STORM OCCURRING ON AUGUST
8, 1971, WAS NOT AN UNPRECEDENTED ACT OF
GOD.
It 1 i : LS been a dmd tted bj the defendant many times
that this particular storm was no* heavier than those that
should be expected in the area

!

» ari, , ,

'<• *

•

.

r

: i.e same . udgt had rendered ,i decisior I-J V H
matter of Erickson v. Bennion? 2b j M%h '..*d r; I ,
- .•

:iv:L:: y negligence.

•

:

-

-(

»!.

i :

ic

,. . (.'• .•'*•]

:r « * ew of the Kr i A ^>n

);ut' La! ;i;. IA i.;. h was deencd denied
' seems rathe1" ridiculous

th«. iefendant lor <-« 1 I purposes.
* Lb;

139,

The undersigned, not being satisfied

with the condition of *hi- complaint
n - . ' — ; •'.

*i..

Ci

! line to be talking

.•.•*•.'• ;

* r^i r« * t<Jf^!id -

J iprecedented severity aJter -he Letter oi Mr. Hansen,
which is defendant's exhibit 1, responding to Mr, Dougherty 1 s
request for reimbursement for f 1 ooci damage

Mr, Hanson In his

letter termed the storm oi August 8th a heavy rainfall.

He

also indicated that such flooding K M occurred in ,.: similar
way a fter heav y ran nfa

• -

'

•'.»•:!• ,vit.

about the condition of the canal and the duty of maintenance
which, of course, is established b\

;

.;--cj--. -,n(- -•.< . :: *"es
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that iiic 'St fl oodi ng of the same type can be expected after
every rainfall of the amount which was experienced on •
AlJJ'.U -.1 I h e 's! I h •
Ai the trial of the matter, the defendant had
failed :.^- produce rainfall records in, their possession
> • .!.'-•. m o i iths before that they would
' ».: required li- --roduce same at the time af i 'M:)I,
5

• h«

JIG

bearing

undersigned had examined ja H ^-c >-d.-* i , -f-< !

. •. ••.'.! •

.id records, t^^j.i* ;«:, hui-r., uould

testify on these items based upon the notes ot in- undersigned
made for sa :I d exam3 natI on, rather tha

s - ~i< »:

to get the rainfa] ] records which wouLo rive taken approximately
two or three hours.

These readings were taken at •n* I,o. 2

plant wiii cl 1 i s a • qi lest::i on of some 3,0

in is procedure was explained and \h>

Dougherty residence.
preliminary items t^ )
!

commencing with page ! M- aaa Latin ^oes

:. .

* '^h i ' n. wort.- affirmed
opinion lu '

Sl

recordQ r
•.ru

7

N

,
\ M-

:~. • h notes ii:*cl t-een made, «11
liunt and admitted that, in his

vexe proper r e a d i n g a ^ 1 ala~a • >• *• h*s

, continued through page 20 from page 14 of

ms^ra )\.*

r-

1, . .

i- noted there are several days in which
* *' (-ss of the readi ng on 8 August,, 1^71 ,

- idino -i'
which is

• ' * rvtr

':. the 10th of October, I960, on page 19,

there i^ a notation

*t;wo inches, I n parenthesis, 'maybe
•, a 1 10tati on of 1« 87

Thei 1- are

several other notations during the period of examination
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8• ••• :it . <_ -t LI_ ;n excess of a n inch,

- •<•; -•..-.

- r . ;" F e b r u a r y . lcuy« on page 1 %
M)/1' *

,,.,

1 ^

inches; 1 March,

->, ±.u3 i n c h e s ; 26 M a r c h , il 58 on page 1 9 , 1 50

! ^ o r u a r y , 19,59 on p a g e 1 9, 1.02 i n c h e s ; and Ir>
February, J ^ " 9 . ] .31
:

c ond :l t :i

inches shown on page 19.

Under the

1 • e s e p r e c I p a 11 o n r e p o r t: s , I. o g e t: h e r wi th M r .

H a n s e n 1 s letter, which is plaintiffs 1 exhibit ] , which is
identified during * "he same questioning of M r . Hunt, there is
was i lot an ui lprecedented act of God
. ^ t'-;"1 rii:>i should have been anticipated.

.jnd \\.-

The statute that actual ly control s this matter
7 -

.

ditches.

1'h

oimply sets forth, the duties of owners of
1 ;-t amplification of this statute that the

undors i n,ne<| hnt:

In en /ihli in I" I I ir f i

flu Erickson case,

quoted earlier, which Is actually a decision of this Dougherty
case i n reverse,

<.\ - he Erickson case the Supreme Court has ':

set oi it the s tati itc , -.

i o-n 7 ":l~ ! - -: •

sions thereof and set,-: ost M M . ,iut

.-t

1 f|1 A

i! (

* 5 *. /: nid

Jn | he

*. Court has indicated that there does have

to be specific negligence.
no

he provi-

i;( rson in control of

water as i t relates to damaginn rr^iM-i-t' - * ^' hs i Erickson case

f

Under these conditions, there is

q U e s t i on tha t th e 11: i a I j i id g e tl \a L t: 11 :i e d b o th o f t:h e s e

c a s e s and w a s a w a r e of the a c t i o n < < ;he Supreme C o u r t in
h i s m e m o r a n d u m d e c i s i o n wa - thinking s p e c i f i c a l l y ot the
E r i c k s o n c a s e , ai id 1 le ma de

;i• fI iici:i ng that at tl le

:

;«:e of

the rainstorm the defendent's agents undertook none of: the
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-9
prophylactic measures available to them to reduce the volume
of water in the canal as it passed the plaintiffs1 home, i.e.
opening the overflow of the Baker Dam, opening the overflows
at the head of the penstock; opening the penstock to its
fullest capacity as it passes through the hydro electric
plant.

The Court further in making its memorandum decision

pertaining to Title 73-1-8, UCA 1953, in codification thereof
cited Washington Canal Company v. Provo Bench Canal and
Irrigation Company, 116 U. 128, 208 P.2d 1119, as to the
degree of care of hazards reasonably to be anticipated and
affirms same in the Erickson v. Bennion case previously cited.
He made a finding that the defendant was aware that the plaintiff had constructed a home in the immediate vicinity of the
canal and in an area where it overflowed its banks on previous occasions.

Also, he made a finding that the capacity

of the canal had been decreased by reason of the use made of
it by the defendant and the maintenance practices employed,
that nothing was done to relieve or minimize the danger to
plaintiffs1 property.

He made the specific finding that the

failure to act, under the circumstances, was negligent conduct and a breach of the duty impressed upon said water user
under Section 73-1-8, UCA 1953. These findings coupled with
the finding of an unsatisfactory maintenance practice very
definitely places negligence on the defendant and certainly
that the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has a duty of
upholding the finding of the trial court where there is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-Insufficient evidence to justify same.

These items were re-

incorporated into Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
by the trial court in Einding 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, and
bearing in mind these were promulgated by the Court and
were based upon specific items of evidence, the Supreme Court
of Utah has no basis on which to set aside these items.
There is no support for appellant's contention that this
was an unprecedented act of God which should not have been
anticipated.
POINT I (B)
(B) THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF ITS CANAL.
There is no question that such findings were made
both in the memorandum decision and in the findings of fact
and conclusions of law as promulgated by the Court.

There

are certain and very definite findings of evidence of the
negligence in two respects based upon ample evidence.
The first of these is that there was a specific
finding of negligence in the maintenance of an operation of
the canal on a day-to-day basis.

Page 63 of the transcript

in the testimony of Jacob Jones and running several pages
thereafter, bearing in mind that Mr. Jones was a former
employee of the power company and had for a long period of
time been involved in the maintenance of this specific canal,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11stated that the matter should have been cleaned out, and that
the matter had not been properly maintained.

This starts at

line 14 on page 63 and runs through page 80. The specific
items of interest, in addition to the generalization, is Mr.
Jones statement on page 63 to the effect that the canal should
have been cleaned out more often, using the term "we". Also,
on page 64 his statement that the normal flood procedure was
to jerk out the boards below the house and let the water in
the forebay down.

The items were specifically identified by

Mr. Jones on page 64 as the security measures identified in
defendant's exhibit 3, which is the map of the canal. Also,
on page 65, Mr. Jones indicated there had been considerable
flooding prior to this, and that these procedures were known
to the personnel.

On page 73 Mr. Jones indicated this was not

an unusual flow, and he indicated that in previous times there
had been more water in the canal than there was on this particular day.
73.

This specific statement is found at line 10 on page

On pages 79 and 80 there is a discussion of moving the

boards on the forebay of the bay, which Mr. Jones indicated
that had this been done, the water level could have been
lowered some 24 to 30 inches.
tenance man on this canal.

This was an experienced main-

Certainly this evidence alone was

sufficient to find the defendant negligent in its maintenance
and operation of the canal, to say nothing of the acknowledgement by Mr. Hansen that there was nothing unusual about the
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-12storm which is plaintiffs1 exhibit 1.

Bearing in mind that

on all these items the trial court heard the witnesses, saw
the demeanor, and made his own decision as to the effect of
the testimony and the weight he gave the testimony.

There is

no basis for any statement that there was not sufficient
evidence to support a finding.

It would seem that appellant

should be saying that the findings were not approved of by
the appellant.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FAILING TO MAKE A
FINDING OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS.
There is no question that as of the 8th of August,
1971, the defense of contributory negligence was still valid
under the Utah law.
Apparently the negligence of the plaintiffs that
is contended to be contributory negligence by the defendant
is building below the canal.

There is actually no allegation

of any negligence on the part of the defendant that can be
identified as such.

It would seem that the defendant is

contending that anyone that is fool enough to build below
one of their canals is automatically contributorily negligent.
In all probability this is the feeling of the defendant inasmuch as they did nothing to alleviate the damage when they
saw it happening.

They simply took the attitude that anyone

that was unfortunate to own land below the canal assumed all
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-13risk of the canal running over regardless of the fact that
there was no unprecedented storm or any other item, and even
when defendant's agents were actually on the ground, they
did nothing to alleviate the damage, although in a question
of a moment or two, they could have opened the penstock and
jerked the boards out of the forebay.

The only item complained

of in appellant's brief is in the second paragraph of Point
II:
"The evidence is undisputed that the plaintiffs
knew of the location of the canal and of the fact
that their property was on a lower elevation than
the canal long before they purchased the property
and constructed their house and culinary well.11
There is actually nothing else even stated in defendant's
brief that could be termed contributory negligence.

Under

these conditions it would seem that the defendant is placing
everyone on notice that if you own property below any canal
or operation of the defendant's, they automatically assume
all risk of being there regardless of what the defendant does.
Again, this is an item that the trier of fact had to determine,
and the trier of fact has determined that there was no contributory negligence.

This is found in the first full para-

graph on page 4 of the Memorandum Decision and paragraph 10
of the Findings of Fact.

Again, the trier of the facts saw

the witnesses on the witness stand, heard the testimony and
judged from the demeanor of the witnesses whether or not there
was any contributory negligence.

There is no question that
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-14the transcript is full of testimony upon which anyone is
justified in finding that there was no contributory negligence.
The difference between this and the Erickson case
in this point is that in the Erickson case neither the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest had clogged a barrow pit
on the side of a road and failed to provide drainage thereunder by a culvert or some other means.

There is nothing

in the evidence to show how plaintiff Dougherty could either
have anticipated or prevented the damage to his property in
the instant case.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE DAMAGE COMPLAINED OF.
This is no question that the trial court approached
this matter specifically with the Erickson case in mind and
the fact that the negligence complained of had to cause the
damage.

Also, there is no question that counsel approached

it on the same basis.

On the Erickson case being promulgated

and on 26 February, 1974, plaintiffs1 counsel feeling that
his complaint was insufficient in the allegations of negligence, specifically made a motion to amend alleging the
specific acts of negligence, to-wit, negligent failure to
control the water in the canal, and that they failed to keep
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-15the canal dug out, failed to keep the banks in a sufficient
state of repair so that the water in the canal together with
the usual runoff of storms could be carried away by the canal,
and specifically alleged that the water overflowed the banks
and did the damage complained of.

In addition, an amended

complaint was filed in March of 1974, two months before the
trial, again alleging these specific acts of negligence.
There is no question

this

case was tried with the Erickson

case in mind.
As far as the defendant was concerned, there is
no question that the matter was approached and tried completely from the standpoint of the Erickson case. Mr.
Erickson1s counsel was one of the counsel for the defendant
and appellant in the instant case, and there can be no
question that the power company approached this matter
strictly from the standpoint of the Erickson case with full
knowledge of the findings of the Erickson case and the decision of same and the act of the Supreme Court in upholding
same, the Erickson case being dated 9 November, 1972 and
being in various preliminary reports and publications in 1973,
and the instant case being tried in May of 1974.
Bearing in mind that the trier of the facts.was
also the trier of facts in the Erickson case and made specific
findings of damage, negligent acts of the defendant causing
the damage, and the failure of the defendant to prove its
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-16contentions of contributory negligence, there can be no
question that the trial court is justified in its finding
that the negligent acts of the defendant were the proximate
cause of the damage to the plaintiffs.
Under these conditions there can be no bona fide
contention that the defendant's negligence was not the
proximate cause of the damage complained of, and under
these conditions, again, the Court saw the witnesses,
heard their statements, saw the demeanor of the witnesses
and considered the physical evidence submitted, being primarily the map which is defendant's exhibit 3, and the
letter from Mr. Hansen which is plaintiffs' exhibit 1.
CONCLUSION
There can be no conclusion except that the trial
court's judgment should be affirmed and collected.

Respep-feful ly submi11 ed,

PATRICK H. FENTjOff
Attorney for Respondents
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